By Emmanuel Nduka
Beneath Zambia’s soil lies one of the resources the world increasingly needs to power its next economic era. Copper is indispensable to electricity networks, electric vehicles, renewable-energy infrastructure, telecommunications and the wider technological economy, making Zambia’s vast deposits considerably more strategic than they were a generation ago.
Heritage Times HT reports that the country is Africa’s second-largest copper producer and one of the world’s significant suppliers, with copper accounting for about two-thirds of its goods exports. Yet that extraordinary geological advantage has produced an uncomfortable paradox. Zambia can be central to the world’s energy transition while millions of its citizens continue to struggle with poverty, high living costs and inadequate access to reliable electricity. That contradiction gave the August 13 presidential election a significance far beyond the contest for State House. It became increasingly a referendum on who should benefit from Zambia’s copper and whether the country’s mineral wealth can finally become the foundation of lasting national prosperity.
President Hakainde Hichilema entered the election arguing that his administration has stabilized an economy that was once trapped in a severe debt crisis. He adds that his government has completed a restructuring of more than $12 billion in debt, attracted major mining commitments and positioned copper production at the centre of its economic strategy. Investors have responded positively, with Reuters reporting that the copper sector accounts for about 70 percent of export earnings and more than 10 percent of GDP, while nearly $10 billion in mining investment has been committed or planned.
Zambia is also targeting an extraordinary increase in copper output, from roughly 890,000 tonnes to as much as three million tonnes annually by 2031. But the political challenge is that macroeconomic recovery does not automatically translate into household prosperity. Zambia’s economic numbers may be improving, yet frustration over food prices, electricity and living standards remains significant, raising the fundamental question of whether a copper boom that enriches government revenues and attracts international capital is also transforming the lives of ordinary Zambians.
The election results themselves underline how closely economics and politics have become intertwined. As of August 16, the Electoral Commission had counted results from 105 of 226 constituencies, with Hichilema on 54.82 percent against 43 percent for his main challenger, Brian Mundubile. If that margin holds through the remaining count, Hichilema would secure another term without a runoff.
Yet whoever eventually occupies State House will inherit a far bigger challenge than simply maintaining investor confidence. Zambia must decide whether the next phase of its copper strategy will continue to focus primarily on extracting and exporting more ore or whether the country can capture a greater share of the value created after the mineral leaves the ground. That distinction is critical because Zambia’s copper is increasingly valuable precisely because the global economy is moving towards electrification, while the highest-value stages of many mineral supply chains, processing, advanced manufacturing, technology and component production remain concentrated outside Africa.
THE NEW BATTLE FOR ZAMBIA’S COPPER
The geopolitical importance of Zambia’s copper is growing alongside its economic value. China has deep commercial involvement in Zambia’s mining industry and remains a major buyer, while the United States is seeking alternative sources of critical minerals as Washington attempts to reduce dependence on China-dominated supply chains. Zambia has consequently found itself in the middle of a much larger contest over the minerals needed for batteries, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing. The US has expanded its strategic engagement with African critical minerals, while Zambia has simultaneously been developing its own critical-minerals strategy and seeking to attract investment from different international partners.
This competition could be a tremendous advantage for Lusaka if it gives the government greater bargaining power, but it could become another version of Africa’s old resource problem if foreign companies compete primarily for access to raw materials while Zambia remains at the bottom of the value chain.
The real opportunity is therefore not simply to produce three million tonnes of copper. It is to use copper as a catalyst for industrialization. That means expanding local processing, developing Zambian suppliers, transferring technology, creating skilled employment and building the energy infrastructure required to support mining and manufacturing. Zambia has already introduced local-content measures and has signalled its intention to develop critical-mineral value chains, but the gap between policy ambition and economic reality remains substantial. The country’s dependence on hydropower has also exposed the mining industry to electricity shortages during droughts, demonstrating that a copper boom cannot be sustained without a reliable energy system.
That is why Zambia’s election matters beyond Zambia. Across Africa, countries possess the minerals required for the global energy transition, from Congo’s cobalt and copper to Zimbabwe’s lithium and South Africa’s platinum-group metals. The continent therefore has an opportunity to turn foreign competition for its resources into leverage for industrial development. But that will happen only if governments negotiate from a position of strength, insist on transparency and value addition, and use mineral revenues to build economies capable of producing more than raw commodities.
It’s either that Zambia’s copper boom could become a model for African economic sovereignty or become another chapter in the continent’s long history of exporting wealth while importing finished products. The question facing the country’s next government is therefore much bigger than how much copper Zambia can dig out of the ground. It is whether, for once, the people living above that wealth can capture enough of its value to change their economic future.
